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#### IV.—EPICUREA.

The letter of Epicurus to Herodotus commences with an introductory paragraph, designed to define the class of readers for whom this Epicurean epitome was prepared. Thereupon the author turns to his theme with the following words: "First, then, one should apprehend that which underlies the words [that is, the sensations on occasion of which we utter, or first uttered, the words], in order that we may have something to which to refer, as to a court of last appeal, opinions, questions, and difficulties, so that, as we construct our argument, every thing may not run on unadjudicated *ad infinitum*, and we thus have but empty words. For, in the case of every word, we must look to its first intention, and there rest the case without requiring further demonstration, if we are to have something to which we can appeal in cases of question, difficulty and opinion."

Then follows a sentence that still wants explanation, § 38: *εἴτε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἀπλῶς τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴ θ' ὅτου διή ποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.* I infer from Usener's Epicurea that this is the reading of the MSS upon which he relies for the text. But *πάντα* before *τηρεῖν* is omitted in F, one of the best MSS. Bruns, Lucrez-Studien, p. 32, n. 1, reports the MSS as reading *εἴτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις*, omitting *κατά*, which is important, if true.

The passage, as it stands, appears to yield no intelligible sense, although Cobet and Hirzel, Untersuchungen, I 125, retain it essentially in this form. Since so much of the doctrine of Epicurus is involved in the understanding of these words, it will be necessary to discuss them at considerable length. Such an examination is the more demanded because even Giussani, in his Lucretius, has hardly advanced the solution of the question. Usener adopts the MSS reading, only substituting *ἐπειτα* for the first *εἴτε*, to obtain an adverb answering to *πρῶτον μὲν*. Unfortunately Usener, like Hirzel, gives no hint as to the construction. Gassendi, besides reading *εἴτα* for the first *εἴτε*, introduced *κατά*

before τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολάς and τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, holding αἰσθήσεις, ἐπιβολάς and πάθη to be like elements in the sentence. Giussani, Lucretius I p. 177, n. 1, demands the insertion of κατὰ in the latter place, but not in the former, asserting that the ἐπιβολαί are not κριτήρια in the same sense as αἰσθήσεις and πάθη.

We shall presently return to this assertion. For the present it will suffice to note that ἐπιβολάς and πάθη are conceived of as like elements of the sentence, as is made evident by the addition of παρούσας and ὑπάρχοντα. These terms are clearly synonymous.<sup>1</sup> We may next consider ἀπλῶς. The word here means 'in short', implying partial similarity and contrast with something that preceded. The choice lies between αἰσθήσεις and πάντα, and the former only will answer. Besides, as Giussani also has seen, in so fundamental a statement of the κριτήρια, πάθη at least must be parallel in construction to αἰσθήσεις. But we have already seen that παρούσας and ὑπάρχοντα place ἐπιβολάς and πάθη in the same construction. Hence αἰσθήσεις, ἐπιβολάς and πάθη belong inseparably together.

We would thus be led to look with favor upon the suggestion of Gassendi that we insert κατὰ before both τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολάς and τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη. The loss of κατὰ in the latter place could readily be explained, as it would follow καί, with which it is often confounded. Its omission in the earlier place would cause more difficulty. But it is possible that there may be a better solution. Even a hasty glance at the context will show that the sentence under discussion was conceived by its author as a close parallel to the one just preceding. There we have ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἑκάστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι . . . while in our sentence we have τηρεῖν which has much the same meaning as βλέπεσθαι.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore the thought of the two sentences is as nearly as possible parallel. Now, if we could render τηρεῖν with 'test,' or 'examine,' the text of Gassendi might stand; for then κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις would properly mean 'by reference to the sensations,' a meaning quite consistent with the sentence itself and with sub-

<sup>1</sup> Cp. § 82: ὅθεν τοῖς πάθεσι προσεκτέον τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι . . . καὶ πάσῃ τῇ παροῦσῃ καθ' ἑκάστον τῶν κριτηρίων ἐναργεῖα. The entire passage affords a striking parallel to § 38 and to § 147, to be considered later. Note also that προσεκτέον here = τηρητέον, for which see τηρεῖν in § 38.

<sup>2</sup> For Epicurus' usage, cp. § 77: ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ σέμνωμα τηρεῖν, κατὰ πάντα ὁνόματα φερόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννοίας, and in the letter to Pythocles, § 88: τὸ μέντοι φάντασμα (= ἐνάρχημα) ἑκάστου τηρητέον.

sequent references to it.<sup>1</sup> But the verb will not bear this interpretation. It would seem, therefore, that the phrase cannot be correct, since no other tenable explanation can be given of *κατά*.

I would therefore omit both *κατά* and *πάντα* and read: *ἔπειτα τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ τηρεῖν καὶ ἀπλῶς τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴ τε διανοίας εἴ θ' ὅτου δὴ ποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.* "Next, we must look strictly to the sense-impressions, and, in short, to the present perception, be it of the understanding, be it of whatever cognitive faculty, and in like manner to the present pleasure-pains, in order that we may have something by means of which we may infer both that which still awaits confirmation by the senses and that which is not accessible to sense-perception."

Now, regarding the words thus rejected, it will be recalled that *πάντα* is not found in F, and that, according to Bruns the MSS omit *κατά*. It is well, however, to attach little weight to these considerations. The foregoing discussion has shown that Usener's text is impossible, and the solution of the problem here given is certainly simpler than Gassendi's. Moreover *κατὰ* and *πάντα* probably belong together. It may be that Epicurus used the words to point the contrast between the two statements, the appeal, in the latter, to *αἰσθήσεις*, *ἐπιβολαί*, and *πάθη* being universal—*κατὰ πάντα*—whereas we resort to the first intention only *καθ' ἑκαστον φθόγγον*. If *κατά* was omitted and set in the margin, it would be easy to account for its insertion at the wrong point.<sup>2</sup> It may be, on the other hand, that the phrase was added by a reader, to mark the above-mentioned contrast.

It remains for us to consider the objection of Giussani that the *ἐπιβολαί* did not belong to the *κριτήρια*. I shall soon discuss in another connection the entire subject of the Epicurean *κριτήρια*, and hence may here touch lightly upon it. The phrase *φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολή*, occurring in §§ 50, 51, shows that the *ἐπιβολή* was a function of the *φантаσία* = *αἴσθησις* (cp. *φантаστόν* = *αἰσθητόν*). But the expression, in § 38, *ἐπιβολὰς εἴ τε διανοίας εἴ θ' ὅτου δὴ ποτε τῶν κριτηρίων*

<sup>1</sup> Cp. § 39: *αὐτὴ ἡ αἰσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ, καθ' ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προείπον*, referring to the preceding §. See also § 68: *ἀνάγων τις ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, μνημονεύων τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ ρηθέντων*.

<sup>2</sup> The common use of *κατά* in reference to the *κριτήρια*, as in § 39, and especially in the *Κύριαὶ Δόξαι*, § 147, which passage from the 'Articles' was of course familiar to every Epicurean, may well have led to the confusion, since, if *κατά* was taken with *αἰσθήσεις*, *πάντα* would naturally assume the place of the wanting object of *τηρεῖν*.

further proves that this function was exercised by an indefinite number of *κριτήρια*. In addition to *αἰσθήσεις* and *πάθη* the Epicureans commonly included in their number also the *προλήψεις*.<sup>1</sup> The definition<sup>2</sup> of *προλήψις* proves that it was a form of *ἐπιβολή*, and indeed it seems but natural to conclude that by the *ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας* Epicurus meant chiefly the *προλήψεις*.<sup>3</sup> I shall pass over the technical *φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας* which the Epicureans, if not Epicurus, accounted one of the *κριτήρια*, because a discussion of it would lead us too far afield. One thing is beyond dispute: Epicurus himself spoke in the most general terms<sup>4</sup> of *κριτήρια*, and the definite formulation of three or four canonical *κριτήρια* is one of the first fruits of the Epicurean scholasticism to which we owe many of our misconceptions of the founder of the school. We may thus dismiss the objection raised by Giussani.

There is a second passage, in § 41, that requires emendation: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι. τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει· τὸ δὲ ἄκρον παρ' ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον πέρασ οὐκ ἔχει· πέρασ δὲ οὐκ ἔχον ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον. "The universe is infinite; for that which is limited has an outermost part. But the outermost part is viewed relatively to something else. Therefore, not having an outermost part, it has not a limit; and not having a limit, it is infinite and not limited."

On reading these words attentively, one will detect in the third clause a weakness in the argument. It is not, strictly speaking, the outermost part of an object that is viewed relatively to something else; for the outermost part is viewed relatively to the other parts of the same object. It is rather *that which has an outermost*

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Diog. Laert. X 31.

<sup>2</sup> Clem. Alex., Strom. II 4, p. 157 Sylb., apparently quoting Epicurus, says; *πρόληψιν δὲ ἀποδίδωσιν ἐπιβολὴν ἐπὶ τι ἐναργὲς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπίνοιαν*. Cp. Philodemus (Sudh. vol. II, p. 40): *ὁψ[ό]μεθα γάρ, ἂν ἐπιβάλλ[ω] με[ν], ἃ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἐνθυμήματα*, where *ἐπιβάλλειν* = *animus advertere*.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Diog. Laert. X 62: *ἐπεὶ τό γε θεωρούμενον πᾶν ἢ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀληθές ἐστιν*. Here τὸ θεωρούμενον refers to the *αἰσθήσεις*, and τὸ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ would most naturally be taken as depending upon the *προλήψεις*.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to the phrase in § 38 now under consideration, compare the sweeping expression in the *Κύρια Δόξαι*, § 147: *τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας*. In the letter to Herodotus, § 82, he says: *ὅθεν τοῖς πάθεσι προσεκτέον τοῖς παρούσι καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι . . . καὶ πάσῃ τῇ παρούσῃ καθ' ἑκαστον τῶν κριτηρίων ἐναργέα*. These phrases show that Brieger is wrong in omitting as spurious the words *εἶτε διανοίας εἶθ' . . . τῶν κριτηρίων*.

*part* that is viewed relatively to something else from which it is distinguished and by which it is limited. We should, therefore, have expected τὸ δὲ ἄκρον ἔχον παρ' ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. This correction seemed to me so self-evident that I added ἔχον in the margin of my text before I observed that Cicero, de Div. II. 50, 103, clearly had before him the correct reading, which he renders exactly: Quod autem habet extremum, id cernitur ex alio extrinsecus.

In § 43 editors of Diog. Laert. have rightly set apart the following passage as a scholion: οὐδὲ γάρ φησιν ἐνδοτέρω εἰς ἄπειρον τὴν τομὴν τυγχάνειν, λήγειν δέ, ἐπειδὴ αἱ ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται, εἰ μέλλει τις μὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀπλῶς εἰς ἄπειρον αὐτὰς ἐκβάλλειν. "And he says farther on that the division of matter does not proceed *ad infinitum*, but that it comes to an end, *since qualities change*, unless one is to carry them [surely not the qualities, but the atoms, are meant] to infinity in point of magnitude as well." Here the clause ἐπειδὴ αἱ ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται not only seriously disturbs the construction, but will prove on examination, I think, to have no relevancy to the argument of the scholion. It seems to be clearly a foreign element intruded by mistake. If one disregards the clause, the remainder of the sentence proceeds directly to the point which is later developed in §§ 56 foll. But there is not the remotest reference in that connection to change of quality as conditioning the argument. And, indeed, it is not easy to see how qualitative change should be affected by the infinite divisibility of matter. In any case infinite divisibility would seem rather to favor such change than to prevent it.

A glance at the connection suggests an explanation of the intrusion of the clause. The scholion was written in the margin to support the assertion ταῖς δὲ διαφοραῖς <sc. αἱ ἄτομοι> οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄπειροι ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀπερίληπτοι. To this scholion, then, as seems to me highly probable, someone added, as an independent argument, a reference to the problem of qualitative change. Anaxagoras had believed in the infinite divisibility of matter and also in the existence of the homoeomeries. He accounted for qualitative change—always only in the mass—by admixture and by the prominence in the bulk of this or that element or set of elements. The Epicureans, however, attributing as they did great efficacy to change in order, position, etc., and having no distinct unchanging qualities to neutralize, required for their purposes far less variety in the elements themselves.

Lucretius II 578 ff. reports an argument which Epicurus doubtless used in this connection. The reason he assigns for the finitude of atomic shapes is that, unless the theory is to contradict the senses by making the atom large enough to be seen, its number of *partes minimae* must be limited and hence the possible arrangements of them are of course finite. The scholion on the *τομή εἰς ἄπειρον* is closely akin to this argument. Lucretius II 500 ff. adduces a second: If the variety of atomic forms were infinite, qualities (which depend upon them) would not be found to keep within fixed limits. There would always be something better than the best, something worse than the worst. Giussani, on Lucretius I 584-598 and II 500-521, holds that this argument is contained in the clause *ἐπειδὴ αἱ ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται*. If so, the form of statement is extremely infelicitous. But whether it be so or not, the confusion of two arguments, for which I am now contending, becomes equally clear in either case.

Immediately after the above mentioned scholion follow the words: *κινουῦνται τε συνεχῶς αἱ ἄτομοι* [φησὶ δ' ἐνδοτέρω καὶ ἰσοταχῶς αὐτὰς κινεῖσθαι τοῦ κενοῦ τὴν εἴξιν ὁμοίαν παρεχομένου καὶ τῇ κουφοτάτῃ καὶ τῇ βαρυτάτῃ] *τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ αἱ μὲν εἰς μακρὰν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διυστάμεναι, αἱ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν παλμὸν ἴσχουσιν, ὅταν τύχῃσι τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλιμέναι ἢ στεγαζόμεναι παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν*. Usener rightly, as I think, marked the scholion as here indicated by the brackets, whereas Cobet included in it the words *τὸν αἰῶνα*. On the other hand, Usener is wrong in indicating a lacuna after *τὸν αἰῶνα*.<sup>1</sup> He believes there should have been made at this point a reference to the downward motion of the atoms due to their weight, and cites Lucretius II. 83 foll. Such difficulties as exist are in great part due, here as frequently in Epicurus, to the intrusion of the scholion. If this is assumed, the required remedy is not far to seek.

Epicurus says that the atoms move continuously forever, and

<sup>1</sup> If there were a lacuna, it must be of considerable length. Epicurus (Diels, *Dox.* 311<sup>a</sup> 10 foll.) said: *κινεῖσθαι τὰ ἅτομα τότε μὲν κατὰ στάθμην τότε δὲ κατὰ παρέγκλισιν*. This classification of atomic motions is all-embracing. The first sort of motion occurs *before the formation of a κόσμος*, and is thus largely hypothetical, requiring no special mention at this point. The *κίνησις κατὰ παρέγκλισιν* embraces all motions occurring within a *κόσμος*. Of these only Epicurus is here speaking. They may be conveniently divided into such as pertain to atoms in a free state and such as belong to them in *concilia*. This classification is here observed by Epicurus, and I see no need of assuming a lacuna. Cp. Brieger, *Epikur's Brief an Herodot.* p. 4 foll., and Giussani on Lucretius, II. 98.

that some of them rebound afar, while others enter into entanglements. Two changes in the text are clearly required. First, *καί* after *αἰῶνα* is to be omitted. When, by the intrusion of the scholion, a break was made in the sentence, someone added *καί* to supply the needed connective. Next, *ἰσχοῦσιν* must be changed back to *ἰσχουσαι*, a reading that gave place to the present one when *καί* was inserted, evidently in order that the sentence might have a main verb. Usener's doubts on this score are due to his assumption of a lacuna. There is, moreover, another phrase that probably requires emendation, viz. *αὐτὸν τὸν παλμὸν ἰσχουσαι*. The use of *αὐτόν* provokes a question. Cobet rendered '*aliae vero agitationem ipsam continent*,' and Munro, on Lucretius II. 98, says, 'others have *simply* a throbbing or oscillation.' This interpretation assumes that *παλμός* was a technical term of very precise meaning, a point not easy to establish.<sup>1</sup> For some such reason as this, scholars have multiplied conjectures: Schneider suggested *τὸν ἀποπαλμόν*, Usener *αὐ* for *αὐτόν*, and Brieger, whom Giussani follows, *αὐτοῦ* for *αὐτόν*.

It appears to me that the meaning of *ἰσχουσαι* affords the clew. The atoms continue or maintain—what, if not *the self-same oscillation*? The change from *αὐτὸν τόν* to *τὸν αὐτόν*<sup>2</sup> is readily made, and seems to afford the required contrast to the *free* paths of the atoms that have not entered into *concilia*.

In § 46–48 Epicurus briefly sketches his theory of the *εἶδωλα*. At the close of § 48 occur these words: *οὐθὲν γὰρ τούτων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ἂν βλέπῃ τίς τινα τρόπον τὰς ἐνεργείας, ἵνα καὶ τὰς συμπαθείας ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξῴθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀνοίσει*. For *ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ*, Weil reads *ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται*. The Tauchnitz stereotype edition prints *ἂν βλέπῃ τις, τίνα τρόπον τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰ εἶδωλα ποιεῖται*. To whom the change and addition are due, I am unable to discover. Gassendi read *ἐναργείας* for *ἐνεργείας*, and Usener, adopting the suggestions of Weil and Gassendi, follows the MSS with the additional change from *ἵνα καὶ* to *τίνα καί*. While I incline to think Usener's *τίνα καί* correct, I cannot satisfactorily understand his text. If we read *τίνα* for *ἵνα*, then *τίνα* must, I conceive, stand for *τίνα τρόπον*. In that case, I think we should transpose to *καὶ τίνα*, as *καὶ ἵνα* would naturally

<sup>1</sup> Cp. the synonymous use of *πάλσις*, in § 50.

<sup>2</sup> For Epicurus' use of *ὁ αὐτός* in this sense, see two examples in Diog. Laert. X 114. I suppose nobody would wish to urge the free internal motions of the flock and the legion (Lucretius II 308–332) against this interpretation. The parable applies only in its large outlines.



become *ἵνα καί* when *τίνα* was mistaken for *ἵνα*. But if *τίνα* stands for *τίνα τρόπον*, then we should doubtless read above *ἂν βλέπη τις, τίνα τρόπον κτλ.* The change from *ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ* to *ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται* is not necessary, but is perhaps desirable. I would therefore suggest: *οὐθέν γὰρ τούτων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ἂν βλέπη τις, τίνα τρόπον τὰς ἐναργείας, καὶ τίνα τὰς συμπαθείας*<sup>1</sup> *ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀνοίσει*, interpreting the sentence thus: "In all this there is nothing in contradiction with the evidence of the senses (and hence, dealing as we are with an *ἄδελον*, we may accept the theory as substantially true, as it has the further advantage of affording a rational explanation of the facts) if one looks to see in what manner one is to trace back to us the sense-impressions and the (other) interactions of things from without."

In § 55 Usener presents this text: *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μετασχημονιζομένοις κατὰ τὴν περιαίρεσιν τὸ σχῆμα ἐνυπάρχον λαμβάνεται, αἱ δὲ ποιότητες οὐκ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι, ὥσπερ ἐκείνο καταλείπεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἀπολλύμεναι.* A period should be set after *λαμβάνεται*; but even so the passage is not clear. In the first sentence *κατὰ τὴν περιαίρεσιν* seems to be incapable of interpretation; probably *προαίρεσιν*, the reading of G and P<sup>2</sup>, followed by Cobet, is to be accepted, since it yields a good sense and the change is palaeographically easy. The second sentence I would write thus: *αἱ δὲ ποιότητες, οὐκ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι, <οὐχ> ὥσπερ ἐκείνο (sc. τὸ μεταβάλλον) καταλείπονται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἀπόλλυνται.* "The qualities, however, not inhering in the vehicle of change, do not, like it, remain, but disappear from the entire mass." The negative repeated at the beginning of successive clauses readily accounts for the loss of *οὐχ*. Cobet's text, reading *ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι ὥσπερ ἐκείνο, οὐ καταλείπονται* would make it necessary to refer *ἐκείνο* to *σχῆμα*, which is, I think, impossible. The other changes seem to be demanded by the thought.

At the beginning of § 67 occurs an interesting instance of the confusion incident to the intrusion of a scholion into the text. Usener prints *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε γε δεῖ προσκατανοεῖν ὅ τι τὸ ἀσώματον*, [Scholion: *λέγει γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμίλιαν*] *τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος ἂν· καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον πλὴν τοῦ κενοῦ.* This text, I dare say, will commend itself to but few. Cobet, failing to detect the scholion, wrote with some freedom *ἀλλὰ μὴν*

<sup>1</sup> Cp. § 50: *τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποδιδόντων καὶ τὴν συμπάθειαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σφύζοντων.*

καὶ τότε γε δεῖ προσκατανοεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἀσώματον λέγω κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος ἄν—in some respects a better text. Lortzing, with the approval of Brieger and Giussani, reads ὅτι τὸ ἀσώματον <οὐ δεῖ κατηγορεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς>, τοῦ ὀνόματος, κτλ. The remedy seems to me extraordinarily simple. The scholion includes the words τοῦ ὀνόματος, and the beginning of the scholion, when it was intruded, crowded out the verb of the ὅτι-clause. The verb was in all probability λέγεται, as this form best accounts for the addition of the marginal note. I would therefore read as follows: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε γε δεῖ προσκατανοεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἀσώματον λέγεται [Scholion: λέγει γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος] ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος ἄν. Those who have observed the disjointed character of the letters of Epicurus, resulting from their being composed largely of excerpts taken entire from larger treatises and pieced together, will not require the addition made by Lortzing.

In § 68 Usener has introduced into his text a conjecture paleographically so unlikely that it provokes dissent. He writes: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ βάρη καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται σώματος ὥσανεὶ συμβεβηκότα ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν σώματος γνωστά, οὗθ' ὥς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσι φύσεις δοξαστέον, κτλ. Here everything may go unchallenged except σώματος γνωστά, where the MSS generally have αὐτοῖς γνωστοῖς, except that P<sup>2</sup> shows αὐτων for αὐτοῖς. Usener's γνωστά for γνωστοῖς seems to be demanded by the context; but σώματος is a poor exchange for αὐτοῖς, without which the corruption of γνωστά to γνωστοῖς is not easy to explain. Just what meaning Usener gave to his text, I do not know. Giussani, Lucretius I, p. 28, who adopts Usener's reading, translates it with "e sono riconoscibili mediante il senso del corpo," and that, presumably, was Usener's understanding of it. But κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν needs no such addition. I believe that αὐτοῖς is sound, a simple dative of reference, looking to ἢ πᾶσι ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς. Then γνωστά became γνωστοῖς by assimilation to αὐτοῖς.

There are two passages in the second letter of Epicurus, so-called, addressed to Pythocles, of which I will speak briefly. The first occurs in § 96. After saying that solar and lunar eclipses may be accounted for by the quenching of the luminaries or by the interposition of other bodies, the writer is made to say: καὶ ὥδε τοὺς οἰκείους ἀλλήλοις τρόπους συνθεωρητέον, καὶ τὰς αἶμα συγκυρήσεις τινῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι. The precise meaning of these words is not clear. It seems probable that they are a misplaced scholion,

having no reference to sun and moon. The occurrence of the word *συγκυρήσεις*<sup>1</sup> suggests that the passage refers to prognostics or astrology; possibly the 'consenting characters' are those of persons born with the same horoscope. In that case the words should be regarded as a scholion to § 98.

The second passage occurs in § 115. The MSS read: *καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τρόποι εἰς τὸ τοῦτο τελέσαι ἀμύθητοί εἰσιν*. Instead of *ἀμύθητοί* Usener has inserted *ἀνύσιμοί*, which is undoubtedly a brilliant conjecture. Although the construction gains by the change, I yet have my doubts about it. It is well known how insistent Epicurus was in his endeavor to exclude all reference to religion and astrology from his consideration of meteorological and astronomical phenomena. Particularly in discussing the stars, as in §§ 114, 115, he would naturally repel the idea of having recourse to *μῦθος*.<sup>2</sup> Hence the emendation of the MSS reading *ἀμύθητοί* would seem to lead us rather to *ἄμυθοί* than to *ἀνύσιμοί*. For this use of *ἄμυθος*, see Plut., Mor. 16 C. The unusual word would easily be displaced by *ἀμύθητος*, which was a prime favorite with late writers, as witness Sext. Empiricus.

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<sup>1</sup> Cp. §§ 98, 115.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. § 87: *δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ*, and § 104: *μόνον ὁ μῦθος ἀπέστω*.